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Commenting on Fanon’s writings on the psychopathology induced by colonisation, critics 
sometimes mention his psychiatric publications, but these texts – which he wrote from 1951 
to 1960, throughout his professional career – are rarely studied for themselves and in their 
evolution. This may be due to their technical nature, or to Fanon’s interest in thérapies de 
choc such as electroshocks and insulin-induced comas, which he practised and wrote about, or 
to his experiments with the first-generation neuroleptics. There may also be some unease at 
his subsuming of psychoanalysis under a more general neuropsychiatric approach, at least 
when he considered it from a clinical point of view. Nevertheless, it is clear that Fanon 
always saw himself above all as a psychiatrist and rarely stopped practising, whether in 
France, Algeria or Tunisia. Had it just been a job running in parallel to his main interests, he 
would probably have developed a private practice.1 But instead he pursued original research, 
published it, presented it at professional congresses, directed doctoral dissertations and had a 
considerable impact on the vocation and careers of those who worked with him. His 
psychiatric texts refer to the most interesting contemporary debates in the field and appear, 
retrospectively, as essential elements of the ecology of his thought. Like his published books, 
they reveal his remarkable creativity and deserve to be studied in their own right.2 
 Fanon started with a reflection on the specificity of psychiatry as opposed to 
neurology. He then published papers on his experiments with neuropsychiatric treatment and 
their limits, moved towards a sociotherapeutical approach, which led him to consider the 
essential role of culture in mental illness, and finally created an institution of psychiatric care 
outside of the asylum which he saw as a blueprint for mental health care in the future. I shall 
 follow this trajectory here. But first I shall indicate briefly why it seems important to pay 
careful attention to all of Fanon’s psychiatric work. 
The first text that needs to be considered is the dissertation in psychiatry that Fanon 
defended in Lyon in November 1951 in order to qualify as a doctor of medicine.3 This 
dissertation is usually presented as a technical work produced in haste to obtain his 
qualification instead of Peau noire, masques blancs, which his supervisor deemed too 
subjective.4 However, there are several reasons to take it seriously in itself and in relation to 
Fanon’s other works. First, the medical case at the heart of the dissertation – a hereditary 
neurological disturbance often accompanied by psychiatric symptoms – is that of a patient he 
observed over a considerable period of time. So this is not a rushed piece of work: Fanon 
studied in a department specialising in neurology and, developing an interest in this topic, he 
considered recent cases in the literature and in nearby clinics. He had the resources he needed 
in order to clarify the distinction between the neurological and the psychiatric, a point that 
was to prove essential both to several of his papers, which focus on the impact of social and 
cultural factors on the development of mental illness, and more generally to his later works on 
alienation. 
Secondly, Fanon makes some important points in his dissertation that look forward to 
his own future professional and intellectual career. On the nature of neuropsychiatry and the 
respective functions of the neurologist and the psychiatrist, for instance, he declares: ‘Loin de 
proposer ici une solution, nous croyons nécessaire une vie d’études et d’observations.’5 
Moreover, in a section on Gestalt Theory’s refusal of atomism and brain localisation and on 
Von Monakow’s insistence on time (not just spatially located lesions) as a crucial factor in the 
development of mental illness, the dissertation makes an explicit link with other aspects of 
Fanon’s thought: ‘Nous aurons l’occasion, dans un ouvrage auquel nous travaillons depuis 
longtemps, d’aborder le problème de l’histoire sous l’angle psychanalytique et ontologique. 
 Nous montrerons alors que l’Histoire n’est que la valorisation systématique des complexes 
collectifs.’6 In a later section Fanon focuses on Jacques Lacan’s theory of the psychogenesis 
of madness in its relationship to the social constitution of personality. He deemed this idea 
essential in Lacan’s work, which he had read closely, probably under the influence of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty whose lectures he followed.7 He writes, in an interesting praeteritio: ‘Nous 
aurions aimé consacrer de longues pages à la théorie lacanienne du langage. Mais nous 
risquerions de nous éloigner davantage de notre propos. Pourtant, à la réflexion, nous devons 
reconnaître que tout phénomène délirant est en définitive un phénomène exprimé, c’est-à-dire 
parlé.’8 It is clear, then, that Fanon invested serious thought in this work and that he saw no 
hiatus between his scientific research and what he intended to do later, even in other areas. 
Thirdly, Fanon’s interest in the biological aspects of psychiatry should not be 
underestimated. Maurice Despinoy, under whom Fanon did his internship at Saint-Alban 
hospital, notes that Fanon showed a great interest in his own pioneering experiments with 
lithium salts and suggests that, had he remained at Saint-Alban, ‘il [Fanon] aurait fait une 
thèse de biochimie’.9 Fourthly, we know that Fanon was a fast worker, dictating his books, 
not using any notes and rarely correcting himself.10 So, far from being a hasty work, this 
dissertation may have taken him as much time to write as his published books: the historical 
review of relevant documented cases and the bibliography are extensive, the references are 
enlightening, his quotations (which are generally accurate) reflect a careful reading of the 
literature and his analyses go to the heart of the problems that were at stake at the time.  And	  finally,	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  clear	  that	  it	  would	  have	  been	  impossible	  to	  submit	  a	  dissertation	  mixing	  first-­‐	  and	  third-­‐person	  analysis	  of	  the	  disalienation	  of	  the	  black	  man,	  such	  as	  that	  contained	  in	  Peau	  noire,	  masques	  blancs.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  given	  that	  such	  phenomenological	  questions	  were	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  contemporary	  psychiatric	  debates	  in	  France,	  under the influence of, among others, Henri Ey and Merleau-Ponty, both 
 of whom were readers of Jaspers. David Macey is right to note that Peau noire, masques 
blancs, which Fanon started writing before embarking on his psychiatric studies, was not 
initially intended as a doctoral thesis,11 but Fanon might well have thought of rewriting and 
submitting the two ‘psychological’ chapters, one subjective, ‘L’Expérience vécue du noir’, 
the other objective, ‘Le Nègre et la psychopathologie’. However, the functions of the works 
are very different: the thesis establishes the ontological ground on which the book stands by 
showing that, even if related initially to neurological troubles, a mental illness unfolds only 
within a social space that in turn explains its form. Conversely, a dissertation on the 
psychopathology of the black man separated from the socio-cultural and historical dimensions 
added in Peau noire, masques blancs would have risked pandering to the essentialism typical 
of the colonial psychiatry Fanon denounced elsewhere, for instance in ‘Le Syndrome nord-
africain’, written at the same time and published in Esprit in February 1952.12 That mental 
illnesses are not natural ‘entities’ is an important thesis in medical debates in this period; 
Fanon defended it forcefully. 
It seems probable, therefore, that, within the framework of a neurologically-oriented 
research environment, Fanon saw in his studies an opportunity to reflect on the philosophical 
issue that the dissertation in effect tackles: the space for freedom and history that a clear 
distinction between the neurological and the psychiatric reveals. It is to this point that I shall 
turn next, before considering the various papers in which he presented his research on clinical 
treatments. 
 
Organogenesis and psychogenesis 
Fanon’s dissertation uses a hereditary neuro-degenerative disease, Friedreich’s ataxia, in order 
to test the reducibility of the mental to the neurological. It ends up showing experimentally 
the relational – and by extension social – dimension of the development of mental illness and 
 of the forms it takes: in most serious cases there is an organic, neurological trouble, which 
requires whatever medical treatment is available at a given time, but this will not be enough to 
sort out the mental disorder, which has its own dynamic and which will require a specific 
cure. That said, if there is no pure organogenesis of mental illness, there is no pure 
psychogenesis either. Fanon deems the opposition obsolete because the forms mental illness 
takes are determined by the structure of relations in which the individual is able or unable to 
participate and therefore by ‘external’ institutional and social forces. The neurological trouble 
can be considered a cause only inasmuch as by dissolving some higher functions (for 
instance, controlling learning or motion) it alters the possibility of social relations. Over time 
the mind will react by reconstructing the personality with what has been left after the mental 
dissolution and in a variety of patterns we classify as different types of mental illnesses. 
The dissertation’s preamble states the purpose of the work: between 1861 and 1931 a 
number of sets of clinical symptoms clustered, so to speak, under a family of hereditary 
neurological degenerations, so as to ‘parvenir à la dignité d’entité’.13 However, Fanon 
contends, this long, complex history shows that here neurological symptom and psychiatric 
symptom ‘obéissaient à un polymorphisme absolu’.14 It was possible and indeed necessary to 
unify the neurological diseases, but this task proved impossible for their psychiatric 
correlates. The well-known ‘Paralysie générale’, described by Antoine Laurent Bayle in 1822, 
had seemed so clearly linked to a specific mental syndrome – megalomaniac delirium and 
progressive dementia – that it had been used by Moreau de Tours and then by nineteenth-
century medical positivism in general to support the idea of an organic substratum to all 
mental illness, an organogenesis of madness.15 By contrast, in the family of hereditary 
neurological degenerations linked to Friedreich’s ataxia, if a proportion of cases were 
accompanied by mental disorders, these alterations were rarely the same. So these diseases 
seemed to question the simplicity of ‘explications causales et mécanicistes’: 
 À une époque où neurologues et psychiatres s’acharnent à délimiter une science pure, c’est-à-
dire une neurologie pure et une psychiatrie pure, il est bon de lâcher dans le débat un groupe 
de maladies neurologiques s’accompagnant de troubles psychiques, et de se poser la question 
légitime de l’essence de ces troubles.16 
 
And in a section of ‘considérations générales’ Fanon states: 
Nous ne croyons pas qu’un trouble neurologique, même inscrit dans le plasma germinatif 
d’un individu, puisse engendrer un ensemble psychiatrique déterminé. Mais nous voulons 
montrer que toute atteinte neurologique entame en quelque sorte la personnalité. Et cette faille 
ouverte au sein de l’Ego sera d’autant plus sensible que le trouble neurologique empruntera 
une séméiologie rigoureuse et irréversible. […] Nous pensons organes et lésions focales 
quand il faudrait penser fonctions et désintégrations. Notre optique médicale est spatiale alors 
qu’elle devrait de plus en plus se temporaliser.17 
 
Such epistemological and disciplinary caution is present throughout Fanon’s work: 
denomination is not ontology and we should always think in terms of processes rather than 
entities. He probably inherited it first from phenomenology and from the debates at the heart 
of French psychiatry during the previous decade, in particular those which opposed Ey, Lacan 
and the neurologists Julian de Ajuriaguerra and Henri Hécaen.18 But this scepticism is also 
essential to the works of Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem and the early Foucault,19 
and we shall see that Fanon used it in a more directly political way to expose the vacuity of 
colonial ethnopsychiatric concepts.20 Within the scope of the dissertation itself it leads to a 
structural approach to mental illness. 
It has been said that the university in Lyon was a psychiatric desert in this period.21 A 
student’s decision to pursue such research would therefore show both remarkable ambition 
and an astonishing ability to engage immediately with the most interesting discussions of the 
time. In fact, it is likely that these debates, which Ey had amply documented, were available 
to Fanon through Merleau-Ponty’s lectures and his published works, with which he was very 
familiar. Also, as David Macey notes, while living in Lyon, Fanon came into contact with the 
most progressive current within French psychiatry.22 In particular, he was introduced by 
mutual friends to Paul Balvet, a distinguished psychiatrist at Le Vinatier hospital, close to 
Lyon, who had published in the September 1947 issue of Esprit an important article on ‘La 
 Valeur humaine de la folie’. He had been a director of the clinic in Saint-Alban where Fanon 
was later to do his internship under François Tosquelles (who had been recruited by Balvet) 
and Maurice Despinoy. In March 1950 Balvet contributed to the special issue of Esprit 
devoted to ‘L’Intervention psychologique et l’“intégrité” de la personne’, an issue with 
articles on neuro-surgery, shock therapies, narco-analysis, psychoanalysis and truth serum. It 
is likely that their discussions would have drawn on these debates, which were at the forefront 
of intellectual life at the time. A young writer interested in philosophy and psychiatry would 
naturally have been eager to take a position and make his mark in this field. 
A clue to what is at stake in the dissertation could be said to lie in the two apparently 
contradictory epigraphs with which it begins. The first is from Nietzsche: ‘Je ne parle que de 
choses vécues et je ne représente pas de processus cérébraux.’23 The second is from a 
presentation to the Société Médico-Psychologique on 8 February 1934 by Paul Guiraud and 
Julian de Ajuriaguerra: ‘La fréquence et l’importance des troubles mentaux dans les maladies 
nerveuses familiales ne permet pas de les considérer comme des accidents fortuits.’24 Guiraud 
was a very senior neurologist at the time, working on the link between neurological lesions 
and psychological disorders. At the same meeting of the Société Médico-Psychologique he 
also presented, with Madeleine Derombies, the study of ‘Un cas de maladie familiale de 
Roussy-Lévy avec troubles mentaux’. The mental disorder manifested itself in depression, 
irritability, disorders of muscular sensitivity paired with breakdown of the synthesis of the 
self (when walking the patient felt he was walked rather than walking, or transported, as in a 
car) and childish delusions of grandeur. In parallel, the young man displayed all the muscular 
and physiological symptoms of Roussy-Lévy disease confirmed by his heredity. So the 
authors conclude that a special mental syndrome is coexisting with a neurological syndrome, 
and they infer, in a text which may have inspired Fanon’s dissertation topic (since it points 
towards a counter-example to a strict neuropsychiatric correlation): 
 Nous estimons que, dans notre cas, la lésion encore inconnue (puisque la maladie de Roussy-
Lévy attend encore son anatomie pathologique) ne se confine pas à la moelle, mais vient 
atteindre les voies ou les centres terminaux de la proprioceptivité dans ces régions mêmes où 
le neurologique devient psychique. Il est en effet amplement démontré que la privation simple 
d’impressions kinesthésiques, ou de tout autre ordre, ne suffit pas pour provoquer des troubles 
tels que le défaut d’appropriation au moi et le sentiment de passivité des actes moteurs. A plus 
forte raison, il faut autre chose pour expliquer les troubles du caractère l’impulsivité, l’état 
dépressif, etc…  
Par contre, dans la maladie de Friedreich, les troubles mentaux sont bien connus. 
Mollaret les a soigneusement étudiés dans sa thèse. Il note, assez fréquemment associés à la 
débilité mentale, les troubles de l’humeur et du caractère, l’impulsivité, l’instabilité. Mais 
dans aucune de ses observations, on ne trouve une liaison aussi étroite que dans la nôtre entre 
le syndrome neurologique et le syndrome mental.25 
 
These considerations on the neuropsychiatric differences between these diseases are crucial to 
understand Fanon’s thought. What is at stake here is the nature of the psychical: Friedreich’s 
ataxia seems to imply the need to develop a theory of its independence from the neurological 
within a scientific framework, i.e. without recourse to a dualist spiritualism. The second case 
presented by Guiraud on that day, this time with de Ajuriaguerra, displayed ‘aréflexie, pieds 
creux, amyotrophie accentuée, signe d’Argyll et troubles mentaux’. Again we find a list of 
neurological disorders linked to mental ones within a neurological syndrome not yet fully 
identified though undeniable and also quite similar to Friedreich’s disease. The authors’ 
conclusion includes the sentence which Fanon will quote as the second epigraph at the 
beginning of his dissertation: the mental disturbances in evidence in these hereditary nervous 
diseases are so frequent and so significant that they cannot be considered as merely fortuitous.  
However, do these coincidences alone explain the form and content of the mental 
troubles themselves? Should we just speak of ‘processus cérebraux’ or should ‘choses vécues’ 
– forms or states of consciousness – be studied in their own right? The careful, detailed 
analysis of the literature on Friedriech’s ataxia, together with the specific case on which 
Fanon focused (‘cas de délire de possession à structure hystérique’, with symptoms such as 
‘agitation, attitudes extatiques, propos sur des thèmes mystiques ou érotiques’26) show in fact 
that these forms are too varied to warrant simple reductionism.  
 The solution comes in a long section of the dissertation comparing the ideas of Ey, 
Goldstein (and von Monakow) and Lacan. Even though Fanon remained, it seems, closer to 
Ey’s organodynamisme on the understanding of the nature of mental illness as a pathological 
personality-reconstruction – the work of a consciousness affected in the first place by 
unrelated underlying neurological troubles – he showed considerable interest in Lacan’s 
insistence on the social dimension of the complex and its impact on the development of 
mental illness.27 In the specific medical case on which Fanon focused, the cerebellar 
degeneration produced dementia and mental immaturity, but the delirium, hysterical 
manifestations and mysticism (délire de possession) had to be explained as the reactional 
behaviour of an ego deprived of social relationships. The original, unrelated neurological 
disorder had inhibited its cognitive and affective development by impeding motricity (an idea 
which may reflect the influence of Henri Wallon, perhaps through Merleau-Ponty): ‘Les 
délires systématisés, les manifestations hystériques, les comportements névrotiques, doivent 
être considérés comme des conduites réactionnelles d’un moi en rupture de relations 
intersociales.’28 Ey famously called ‘écart organo-clinique’ the space of the ‘trajectoire 
psychique’ of self-reconstruction by consciousness following a neurological dissolution 
which results in what we see as mental illness.29 For Fanon, this space was structured by a 
multiplicity of social as well as cultural factors. So his subsequent professional articles and 
manuscripts first study the use and limits of available neuropsychiatric treatments and then, 
especially when he was directly faced with the social divisions proper to the colonial setting, 
the role of society and culture in relation to mental illness and the consequent uses and limits 
of social therapy and psychotherapy as treatments when kept within the context of the asylum. 
 
Value and limits of neuropsychiatric treatments 
 Fanon’s dissertation made it possible to imagine a neuropsychiatric approach to the treatment 
of mental illness. In all the subsequent texts he published in this domain, this cure is in two 
steps: first an initial organic treatment, consisting usually of sleep therapy (cure de sommeil) 
or shock therapies – electroshocks (thérapeutique de Bini), insulin comas (cure de Sakel) – 
aimed at wiping the slate clean of previous reactive constructions, and then a long phase of 
psychotherapeutical work to reconstruct personality and bring the patient back to some 
normal social existence.30 Mental illness is never seen as an extreme form of freedom but 
rather as ‘pathologie de la liberté’, a phrase Fanon used in several texts, referring to Ey, who 
himself had borrowed it from an eponymous paper by Günther Anders.31 Such a conception 
of madness as a pathology of freedom was opposed to that of Lacan, who saw in the 
possibility of madness an essential dimension of human existence, hence his closeness to the 
Surrealists.32 
After his studies in Lyon and a short stay in Pontorson, Fanon went to Saint-Alban to 
work with the revolutionary psychiatrist François Tosquelles, advocate of socialthérapie 
(subsequently psychothérapie institutionnelle), and published with him and a number of other 
colleagues a series of texts which all centered on shock therapies.33 What is interesting here is 
that these treatments are never considered as cures in themselves but as preparations for the 
psychotherapeutical work proper. The papers describe cases of patients who presented serious 
psychotic disorders. Fanon and Tosquelles recall at length the various debates on the risks and 
ethics of shock therapies and note that one of the reasons for the reluctance to use them is a 
belief in the permanence of personality: ‘N’y a-t-il pas derrière cette attitude une 
méconnaissance du dynamisme de la personnalité tel que la psychanalyse nous le montre?’34 
The personality that the shocks will decompose is not a fixed essence but one that has been 
built pathologically as a reaction to the initial disturbance and dissolution. These shocks 
(which Fanon kept on using extensively in Blida and in Tunis) were seen in turn as 
 dissolutions of pathological reconstructions. But that implied that special conditions should be 
set up to help the patient reconstruct his or her personality; this is where psychotherapy 
(mostly group therapy) and institutional therapy came in, the latter consisting in the 
construction of a microcosm of the ‘real’ world where the patient was made to assume 
throughout the day an active role through work and the organisation of various other 
activities. The reconstructed social structure was therefore a crucial factor in the 
reconstruction of personality: 
Nous insistons sur le fait que, pour traiter les maladies dans cette perspective, il faut, à la fois, 
accorder la plus grande importance au dispositif hospitalier, au classement et au groupement 
des maladies, à l’établissement concomitant des thérapeutiques de groupe. La coexistence de 
l’atelier des quartiers et de la vie sociale de l’ensemble de l’hôpital est aussi indispensable que 
l’étape d’analyse active, interventionniste, qui précède la cure. La cure de Bini, hors de cette 
possibilité d’enchaînement thérapeutique, nous semble un non-sens.35 
 
Thérapie institutionnelle rested on the idea that the institution of the asylum – not just its 
patients – needed a cure. The first neuroleptics came into use in the mid-1950s; Fanon was 
among the first to experiment with them, in particular in Tunis.36 Prior to these treatments the 
asylum remained a place of internment: patients who may not have had serious problems in 
the first place reacted to its conditions in a cycle of violence that in turn condemned them to 
perpetual confinement. The Second World War, with its combination of slow extermination 
through hunger in French asylums and its legacy of images from concentration camps,37 made 
the model of the asylum untenable. In itself, the diagnosis that patients developed mental 
diseases largely unrelated to their initial illness because of the structure of the institution was 
not new; it had already been made in the mid-nineteenth century by Maximien Parchappe, 
inspecteur général des asiles pour aliénés, who oversaw the second wave of asylum 
construction in France and wrote that most mental diseases were produced by internment. 
Fanon knew of him via Philippe Paumelle, a contemporary from his medical studies, who 
himself became a pioneer of institutional therapy in Paris and created ‘psychiatrie de 
secteur’.38 In France the innovation was the solution developed by Tosquelles in Saint-Alban, 
 who aimed to abolish all the structural constraints linked to internment – not just the 
instruments of restraint but also forced idleness and routine – and to recreate within the 
hospital and under medical supervision the structures of external society, paying great 
attention to the texture of daily life as opposed to the traditional routine of the morning visit 
followed by an inactive day. The hospital was to be run in all its material and social 
dimensions jointly by the patients and the nurses, the latter needing complete retraining. 
Slowly, in a controlled way, most patients recovered at least to the extent of being able to 
interact with each other. Thérapie institutionnelle was at the origin of the ‘antipsychiatry’ 
movement of the 1960s, in particular the experiments of Félix Guattari and Jean Oury in La 
Borde clinic; Oury had also been an intern under Tosquelles in Saint Alban and knew Fanon 
well. 
 
Socialtherapy and culture 
When Fanon arrived in Blida in November 1953, equipped with his organo-dynamic and non-
essentialist conception of mental illness and his experience of institutional therapy, he found 
himself thrown into a situation which was to have a remarkable impact on the evolution of his 
thought. Blida-Joinville was a deuxième ligne hospital, after Mustapha in Algiers. This meant 
that patients there were likely to be considered incurable. As soon as he arrived, Fanon set out 
to reform the wards under his responsibility. He was offered a unique experimental situation 
in so far as the wards were segregated along ethnic lines between Européens and Indigènes; 
he was given two wards, one of European women, the other of Algerian men.39 It turned out 
that while socialthérapie worked wonders with the European women, it was a complete 
failure with the Algerian men. Fanon wrote a paper on this failure with his intern, Jacques 
Azoulay, whose dissertation he supervised.40 Going beyond the specific colonial experience, 
they took the opportunity to reflect in greater depth on the process of social therapy. For 
 instance, if the film club, the music society and the hospital journal (all of which were run by 
patients) worked, it was not just because of the films, the music or the texts in themselves, but 
because they were instruments through which the patients could re-learn to impart meaning to 
elements constitutive of an environment: 
Le cinéma ne doit pas rester une succession d’images avec un accompagnement sonore: il faut 
qu’il devienne le déroulement d’une vie, d’une histoire. Aussi la commission du cinéma, en 
choisissant les films, en les commentant dans le journal dans une chronique spéciale, donne-t-
elle au fait cinématographique son véritable sens.41  
 
This worked and soon, as in Saint-Alban, Fanon was able to discard straightjackets and other 
instruments of restraint in the European ward. But why did these reforms fail with the 
Algerian men, who remained within the old cycle of indifference, withdrawal and agitation? 
The answer was to be found not in some racial features but in the fact that attributions of 
meaning can only be made within certain frames of reference and that these are not universal 
but culturally determined: ‘À la faveur de quel trouble du jugement avions-nous cru possible 
une sociothérapie d’inspiration occidentale dans un service d’aliénés musulmans? Comment 
une analyse structurale était-elle possible si on mettait entre parenthèses les cadres 
géographiques, historiques, culturels et sociaux?’42 So Blida presented Fanon with the ideal 
experimental situation in which to address the problems that had been haunting him since his 
dissertation and Peau noire, masques blancs, namely those of the connection of the 
neurological with the psychiatric and of the psychiatric with the social. With his interns (in 
particular Jacques Azoulay and François Sanchez), he set out to study, in local cultures, the 
ways in which diseases were conceptualised.43 They studied and wrote papers on marabouts’ 
exorcisms, which were based on the belief in Djinns (forces deemed to have taken over the 
personality of mental patients), as well as on the impact of colonisation on these cultures. As 
far as treatment in Blida was concerned, the solution became obvious and a complete 
reorganisation of the socialtherapeutical activities followed – the opening of a café maure, the 
celebration of traditional festivals, regular evenings with story tellers and local music groups 
 – all of which soon involved more and more patients. A keen footballer, Fanon also had 
patients build a football pitch of which he was very proud and which is still in use. The 
principle established by Fanon and Azoulay, then, was in effect a complete reversal of the 
prevalent ethnopsychiatric gaze.44 
The psychiatric works that Fanon went on to publish, especially those on mental illness 
in North Africa, explore the major theoretical issue revealed by this experience and attack 
pre-war colonial psychiatry as fallacious in that it naturalised mental disorders which now 
clearly appeared as determined by features of a social and cultural environment. It is true that 
neurological problems are often at the origin of mental illness, but the psychiatric syndromes 
in themselves are irreducible to them: reductionism joined with racial prejudice had served 
only to ground racism in pseudo-science. Speaking at the Congrès des médecins aliénistes et 
neurologues de France et des pays de langue française in Nice in September 1955, Fanon and 
his colleague Raymond Lacaton addressed the subject of mental illness in North Africa by 
tackling a legal problem: in North Africa, while most ‘European’ criminals confess once the 
evidence against them has been presented to them, ‘indigenous’ North Africans rarely do so 
even when faced with irrefutable evidence – and they do not try to prove their innocence 
either. The reaction of the police and public opinion is to naturalise this behaviour by saying 
that the North African is a liar by constitution. ‘Primitivist’ psychiatrists such as Antoine 
Porot, who shaped psychiatry in Algeria before the war and founded the so-called école 
d’Alger, explained it in a more subtle way, citing a racial inability to integrate the data of 
experience into a common objectivity, such as when very young children deny misdeeds they 
have seen their parents observe: it is as if these people had remained at an earlier, ‘primitive’, 
phylogenetic stage. Fanon, for his part, offered a philosophical reflection on the cultural 
conditions and legal history of confession, citing Sartre, Bergson, Nabert, Dostoyevsky and, 
importantly, Hobbes: 
 Il y a un pôle moral de l’aveu: ce que l’on nommerait sincérité. Mais il y a aussi un pôle 
civique et l’on sait qu’une telle position était chère à Hobbes et aux philosophes du contrat 
social. 
J’avoue en tant qu’homme et je suis sincère. J’avoue aussi en tant que citoyen et 
j’authentifie le contrat social. Certes une telle duplicité est noyée dans l’existence quotidienne 
mais dans des circonstances déterminées il faut savoir la retourner.45 
 
A confession can make sense only within a homogeneous group which is recognised by the 
individual and which recognises the individual. Its role is minimal in modern judicial 
procedures since it does not have the status of proof. The acceptance of culpability is 
therefore better understood as a way of initiating a reintegration within the social group, but 
this implies that there was one group in the first place and that the individual belonged to it at 
some point. The published article picks up from this point: there cannot be reinsertion within 
a group in a case where there was no belonging to it in the first place. Because the indigenous 
North Africans are part of a different group, with its own ethical-social norms, including a 
different code of honour, they simply cannot legitimise the foreign system through a 
confession. They may well submit fully to the judgement, but as a decision of God, and, 
Fanon contends, submitting to a power is not the same as accepting it: 
Pour le criminel, reconnaître son acte devant le juge c’est désapprouver cet acte, c’est 
légitimer l’irruption du public dans le privé. Le Nord-Africain, en niant, en se rétractant, ne se 
refuse-t-il pas à cela ? Sans doute voyons-nous ainsi concrétisée la séparation totale entre 
deux groupes sociaux coexistants, tragiquement, hélas! mais dont l’intégration de l’un par 
l’autre n’a pas été amorcée. 
Ce refus de l’inculpé musulman d’authentifier par l’aveu de son acte le contrat social 
qu’on lui propose signifie que sa soumission souvent profonde, que nous avons notée en face 
du pouvoir (judiciaire en l’occurrence), ne peut être confondue avec une acceptation de ce 
pouvoir.46 
 
In the end this question of ‘legal medicine’ reveals that, in the colonial society, there is no 
shared social contract. The legal system shows an irreconcilable contradiction between 
colonialism and the contractual understanding of the social, which was one of its 
justifications; the idea of a corresponding mental disorder that would naturally be specific to a 
race is just a mask for this contradiction. Under the guise of science, the naturalisation of 
 mental illness along racial lines advocated by the école d’Alger was in reality a failed attempt 
to naturalise a European system of culture.47 
The problem raised by applying socialthérapie to the Algerian men on the ward in Blida 
was, therefore, that ‘le biologique, le psychologique, le sociologique n’avaient été séparés que 
par une aberration de l’esprit’.48 In order to explore the real links between these dimensions, 
Fanon went back to his books. He read sociologists and anthropologists like Marcel Mauss, 
André Leroi-Gourhan and George Gursdorf to understand the relationship of individual 
members of a group to a social whole and he adopted Mauss’s concept of fait social total.49 
Among the crucial practices which define a society at the intersection of economics, law, 
religion, magic and art, attitudes to madness played a significant role for Fanon. In a paper co-
written with François Sanchez in 1956, Fanon focuses on popular attitudes to mental illness, 
studied by observing marabouts’ therapeutic procedures and commissioning translations of 
the treatises of demonology to which they refer. What is striking, according to Fanon and 
Sanchez, is that in Europe, even though madness is now conceptualised in terms of illness and 
not of evil, social attitudes outside as well as within the hospital are still very reliant on a 
moral as opposed to a medical mental framework. Even trained psychiatric nurses tend to 
‘punish’ the patients who create trouble, and members of their families feel personally hurt by 
their attitude, therefore assigning to them some moral responsibility: 
L’occidental croit en général que la folie aliène l’homme, qu’on ne saurait comprendre le 
comportement du malade sans tenir compte de la maladie. Cependant cette croyance 
n’entraîne pas toujours en pratique une attitude logique, tout se passe comme si l’occidental 
oubliait souvent la maladie: l’aliéné lui paraît montrer quelque complaisance dans le morbide 
et tendre à en profiter plus ou moins pour abuser son entourage.50 
 
The North African vision, by contrast, is very different: 
S’il est une certitude bien établie c’est celle que le maghrébin possède au sujet de la folie et de 
son déterminisme. Le malade mental est absolument aliéné, il est irresponsable de ses 
troubles; seuls, les génies en supportent l’entière responsabilité.51 
 
 If you truly believe that the mad are ill because they are ruled by external forces, you will not 
adopt an intentional stance, let alone a moral one, towards the mentally ill: 
La mère insultée ou battue par son fils malade, ne songera jamais à l’accuser d’irrespect ou de 
désirs meurtriers, elle sait que son fils ne saurait en toute liberté lui vouloir du mal. Il n’est 
jamais question de lui attribuer des actes qui ne relèvent pas de sa volonté qui est de part en 
part soumise à l’emprise des génies.52 
  
Fanon thus implies that these societies are more advanced in terms of hygiène mentale than 
European ones, but not because of some religious fascination with madness itself: ‘Ce n’est 
pas la folie qui suscite respect, patience, indulgence, c’est l’homme atteint par la folie, par les 
génies; c’est l’homme en tant que tel.’53 Europe has to learn from these attitudes if it is to 
develop different systems of mental assistance, but this in no way implies, for Fanon, 
abandoning European psychiatry, as the statement at the end of the paper makes clear: ‘Si 
l’Europe a reçu des pays musulmans les premiers rudiments d’une assistance aux aliénés, elle 
leur a apporté en retour une compréhension rationnelle des affections mentales!’54 
 
Beyond the institution 
Fanon’s experience in Blida showed that cultural and not just social aspects had to be 
considered to make the institutional therapy model work. He went further still, asking whether 
it was possible to dispose of the institution itself. In a paper co-authored with Sliman Asselah, 
Fanon questioned the idea that the hospital could ever be the exterior milieu, adding that if it 
were so, then external relations of power would also be transposed into it.55 
This is why, during his final years in Tunis, Fanon spent a substantial amount of time 
building up a day-care centre, attached to a general hospital, which would replace the 
psychiatric hospital. The last of his published psychiatric papers, dating from 1959, is a long 
report on this experiment, covering almost two years of activity. Fanon was extremely proud 
of this achievement and saw it as a very advanced model of psychiatric care to be developed 
everywhere in the world but especially in future decolonised countries because of its low cost 
 and much superior psychiatric efficiency.56 The advantage of a day-care centre rather than an 
institution of internment is that socialtherapy could take place within the normal social 
environment of the patients who went back home every evening, having undergone a suitable 
course of treatments during the day, including, if necessary, an initial course of shock therapy 
or hypnotherapy, together with a variety of psychotherapies, individually or in groups. In his 
paper Fanon reiterates several times the view inherited from Ey that madness is a pathology 
of freedom: 
La maladie mentale, dans une phénoménologie qui laisserait de côté les grosses altérations de 
la conscience, se présente comme une véritable pathologie de la liberté. La maladie situe le 
malade dans un monde où sa liberté, sa volonté, ses désirs sont constamment brisés par des 
obsessions, des inhibitions, des contre-ordres, des angoisses. L’hospitalisation classique limite 
considérablement le champ d’action du malade, lui interdit toute compensation, tout 
déplacement, le restreint au champ clos de l’Hôpital et le condamne à exercer sa liberté dans 
le monde irréel des phantasmes. Il n’est donc pas étonnant que le malade ne se sente libre que 
dans son opposition au médecin qui le retient. […] À l’Hôpital de Jour […] l’institution en 
fait, n’a aucune prise sur la liberté du malade, sur son apparaître immédiat. […] Le fait pour le 
malade de se tenir en mains à travers l’habillement, la coupe de cheveux et surtout le secret de 
toute une partie de la journée passée en dehors du milieu hospitalier renforce et en tout cas 
maintient sa personnalité à l’opposé de l’intégration dissolvante dans un Hôpital psychiatrique 
qui ouvre la voie aux fantasmes de morcellement corporel ou d’effritement du moi.57 
 
Corporeal fragmentation, crumbling of the self under the medical gaze and the psychiatric 
institution: these are notions that Fanon had already used in Peau noire, masques blancs to 
describe the effect of the racist gaze and the colonial institution on the lived experience of the 
black man.58 But in North Africa the context has changed. Reading like the blueprint for a 
public mental health programme for a new country, Fanon’s paper about a day-care centre in 
Tunis lays the groundwork for what was to be, under the guise of psychiatrie de secteur, a 
considerable transformation in France too. There is no doubt that Fanon enjoyed the life of 
the revolutionary, the ambassador and the journalist, but it is clear too that he now intended to 
dedicate his life to the organisation, within his own expertise, of the social institutions best 
able to tackle pathologies of freedom.59 
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